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Abstract 
In this paper we describe the Spanish electricity industry and its 
current regulatory regime. Special emphasis is given to the 
description and discussion of market design issues (including 
stranded cost recovery), the evolution of market structure, 
investment in generation capacity and network activities. We also 
provide a critical assessment of the 1997 regulatory reform, 
which did not succeed in introducing effective competition, but 
retained an opaque regulation which has been subject to 
continuous governmental interventionism. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the Kyoto agreement could show the lack of 
robustness of the regulatory regime.  
 
Competition is good for society because it increases efficiency and it is 
good for consumers because they benefit from efficiency gains through price 
cuts. This general principle could well have applied to the Spanish electricity 
industry, if only effective competition had been introduced. In 1997, the 
Spanish regulatory authorities reached an agreement with the electricity 
companies to reform the industry,1 starting on January 1998. The main 
innovation introduced by the new regulatory regime was the reliance on a spot 
market (dominated by two large producers) as a way to allocate production and 
determine wholesale prices. Nevertheless, the industry remained heavily 
regulated in ways that made the wholesale market unable to transmit efficiency 
signals. Regardless of market prices, what consumers end up paying and firms 
receiving is ultimately determined by regulated tariffs, set by the government on 
a multi-year basis. Hence, contrary to the authorities’ claims, the reduction in 
retail prices since the 1997 reform (a 16.6% in nominal terms, and a 35.6 % in 
real terms) does not prove its success.2 Rather, we argue that the retail price 
decrease hides the lack of a real reform. 
                                                 
1 Protocolo para el Establecimiento de una Nueva Regulación del Sistema Eléctrico Nacional, 
December 1996; (text, in Spanish, available at 
http://www.unesa.es/documentos_regulacion/Pro11-12.zip). 
2 These price-cuts have been possible thanks to factors such as the reduction in interest rates over 
the period 1998-2003, a more intensive use of the existing capacity (to the extent that the system 
has been operating at weak reserve margins), a strong decrease in the costs of the regulated 
activities, and administrative decisions unrelated to any cost considerations (capacity payments 
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 This paper describes the Spanish electricity industry and its current 
regulatory regime. Section 1 focuses on electricity generation, whereas Section 2 
deals with network activities, namely transmission, distribution and 
interconnection. Section 3 concludes with some remarks concerning the evolution 
of the industry. 
 
  
1. ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE SPANISH ELECTRICITY 
INDUSTRY 
 
Since 1998, electricity is traded in a spot market with features similar to 
many electricity markets around the world. Still, this market has several 
specificities worth emphasising in order to understand the way competition 
among the electricity producers takes place.  
 
1.1. Supply and demand for electricity 
 
Spain is a peninsular system with weak interconnections (see section 2.1 
below). Essentially, electricity is produced by four vertically integrated 
incumbent firms: Endesa, Iberdrola,3 and two smaller competitors, Unión 
Fenosa, and Hidrocantábrico. Gas Natural, the most important gas producer in 
the country, has been the main, among the few, new entrants.4 The generation 
mix is made of hydro power (27.9% of total capacity in 2003), coal (18.6%), 
oil-gas (15.3%), nuclear (12.1 %), CCGTs (6.8%), and renewable resources, of 
which wind is the most important (8.5 %).5 Figure 1 below depicts the monthly 
evolution of electricity production in the Spanish electricity wholesale market 
from 1998 to 2004, disaggregated by technology type. 
 
 
                                                                                                       
have been cut down, tariff deficits have been passed to future years, etc.). Since 2002, the 
government has ruled that retail prices cannot increase by more than a 2% per year for the 
following eight years.  
3 In 2003, Endesa controlled 37% of the total installed capacity and 40.5% of the production in 
the pool. These figures were respectively 39% and 36.7% for Iberdrola. 
4 There are new players in the industry. Nevertheless, we find it inappropriate to consider them 
as new entrants to the extent that they have entered by taking control of already existing 
companies. For instance, the Italian and Portuguese incumbents, ENEL and EDP, have acquired 
Viesgo and Hidrocantábrico. There have been other, strictly speaking, new entrants, who are 
currently involved into the construction of new plants that are not yet operating. Some of these 
new entrants (ENRON, AES, TXU, etc.) have already sold their projects to existing companies. 
The CCGT plant Bahia Bizkai Gas is operating since the beginning of the current year, and its 
25% is owned by Iberdrola. 
5 Data source: “Informe sobre le operación del sector eléctrico en 2003”, Red Eléctrica de 
España. 
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Figure 1: Electricity production disaggregated by technology type in the Spanish 
day-ahead market, January 1998-April 2004 (Data source: OMEL)6 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, demand has exhibited a rapid growth. 
Since 1998, the average annual growth rate has exceeded 6 % (ranging from 
2.7% in 2002 to 6.6% in 1998). Electricity demand typically peaks in winter, 
although summers register new records, due in part to the development of air 
conditioning. Over the day, the average demand pattern is quite volatile, with 
demand typically peaking at 9:00pm. There exist pumping stations (in 2003, 
these have represented 4.2% of total capacity) that increase the demand for 
thermal units at night and provide hydro electricity during the day when prices 
are higher.  
 
1.2. Market design 
 
The Spanish Electricity Market is organized as a sequence of markets: 
the day-ahead market, several intra-day markets that operate close to real time, 
and the ancillary services market.7 Participation in these markets is not 
compulsory, as market participants are allowed to enter into physical bilateral 
contracts.  
 
The day-ahead market, which concentrates most of the volume of trade, 
is composed of 24 hourly markets that clear once a day. On the supply side, the 
Spanish electricity producers and the external agents, if not tied to a bilateral 
                                                 
6 Before 2002, the Special Regime was discounted from the distributors’ demand and hence does 
not appear in the graph (see Royal Decree 841/2002, 2 September 2002).  
7 See “Electricity Market Activity Rules” (April 2001), available in English at 
 http://www.omel.es/ es/pdfs/EMRules.pdf. 
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contract, submit supply functions specifying the minimum price at which they are 
willing to produce a given amount of output from each of their production units. 
Supply functions have to be non-decreasing and can include up to 25 price-
quantity pairs per production unit. They can also include several conditions such 
as ‘minimum income’, ‘indivisibility’, ‘load gradient’, and ‘scheduled shutdown’. 
The demand side is made of distributors who purchase the electricity demanded 
by the non-eligible consumers at regulated tariffs, the retailers who sell electricity 
to the eligible consumers at unregulated prices, the eligible consumers who 
choose to participate directly into the pool, and the external agents. They submit 
demand functions specifying the maximum price at which they are willing to 
purchase a given amount of electricity. The demand functions can include up to 
25 price-quantity pairs.8  
Once the supply and demand bids have been submitted, the market 
operator (Compañía Operadora del Mercado de Electricidad, OMEL) constructs a 
merit order despatch by ordering the supply and demand bids in ascending and 
descending order, respectively. The despatch and the equilibrium prices are 
determined through market clearing, i.e. by computing the intersection between 
the industry supply and demand curves. Conditionally on being despatched, the 
price to be received or paid by the market participants is set according to a 
uniform-price auction. Namely, irrespectively of their bids, the price they receive 
(if producers) or pay (if distributors, retailers or eligible consumers) is set equal 
to the highest accepted supply bid (the so-called System Marginal Price).9 
Once the day-ahead market closes, the System Operator (Red Eléctrica de 
España, REE) studies the feasibility of the despatch and, on the basis of the bids 
submitted by market participants in the day-ahead market, modifies it by adding 
or removing the energy required to solve the congestion.10 The production units 
used to solve the transmission constraints are paid their own bid, whereas the 
units which are  displaced from the despatch do not receive any payment at all. 
The extra-costs for solving the constraints are recovered though a lump-sum, 
and hence do affect the value of the SMP.11 The System Operator also runs 
                                                 
8 The distribution companies acquire the energy demanded by the consumers subject to regulated 
tariffs. Hence, they typically act as price takers and submit flat demand schedules at the price 
cap, 18.03 c€/kWh. 
9 In its monthly report, the market operator publishes a table showing by colours which 
technology has been the "price-setter", that is the technology called last in the merit order to 
match demand in each day-ahead market. It is interesting to notice that at peak hours, the hydro 
technology (including pumping stations) almost always sets the price, thanks to its flexibility.  
10 In most cases, congestion problems give rise to pockets of local market power, in which there 
is a single company capable of solving the transmission constraint. See the Conclusions for more 
on this. 
11 At the time of writing this paper, there is a Royal Decree subject to administrative approval 
aimed at modifying these market processes. The out-of-merit units capable of solving the 
congestion will submit additional bids, whereas the ones in-merit that have to be displaced will 
also submit additional bids (i.e. the minimum price they are willing to accept to be displaced). 
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several markets in which production units compete to commit their capacity to 
provide ancillary services when needed. 
Following these procedures, market participants may adjust their 
positions in either direction (e.g. producers may submit purchase bids if they 
expect to be short, and distributors, retailers and eligible consumers may submit 
sale bids if they anticipate to be long) in a sequence of six intra-day markets. 
The bidding and market-clearing processes in these markets are similar to the 
ones in the day-ahead market. In particular, all units are bought or sold at the 
highest accepted bid.  
Last, the System Operator runs several markets that allow market 
participants to overturn any potential deviation with respect to their previously 
undertaken commitments.  
 
The so-called final price of electricity comprises the equilibrium prices 
in the previously described markets and the per-kWh costs of running the 
technical processes needed to balance the system. Furthermore, the final price 
includes a capacity payment. The average capacity payment per kWh paid by 
consumers is currently equal to 0.481 c€/kWh, though it was initially set at 
0.785 c€/kWh and subsequently reduced to 0.697 c€/kWh (see Figure 2).12 In 
order to be entitled to receive capacity payments, a production unit must bid 
into the wholesale market (those units subject to bilateral contracts and the 
external agents do not have the right to receive capacity payments).13 The total 
amount of capacity payments paid by consumers is shared among the units 
entitled to them in the following way.  
                                                                                                      
First, the production units in the so-
called “Special Regime” (mainly cogeneration and renewable energy) are paid a 
capacity payment equal to 0.9015 c€/kWh times their production. The residual 
amount of capacity payments is shared among the remaining production units, 
proportionally to their capacities (corrected by the unit’s availability rate in the 
current month).14  
 
 
Surprisingly, demand will not be allowed to participate into these auctions, even though the 
outcome would be physically equivalent. 
12 The structure of the capacity rates paid by the different consumers is very opaque, and it is 
subject to periodical revisions. For instance, these rates depend on whether the consumer buys 
electricity through a distributor or directly into the pool. For the latter, the capacity rates vary 
across the day in ways that depend, among others, on the type of access tariff they are subject to 
(see UNESA 2004). The total value of the capacity payment paid by a consumer is equal to his 
demand times the rate that applies at each moment. 
13 It has been argued that the fact that firms are entitled to receive capacity payments only if the 
participate into the day-ahead market has discouraged firms from entering into physical bilateral 
contracts, even though these are permitted. 
14 In computing capacity payments, the capacity of the hydro units is a function of their 
production in the previous years. 
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Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the final price in the Spanish electricity 
market from January 1998 to June 2004, and decomposes it into its different 
elements. As can be seen, prices seem to be rather stable during the first two 
years of operation (1998 and 1999),15 with the average final price moving around 
3.6 c€/kWh, approximately equal to the implicit price-cap imposed by the 
payment of stranded costs (see section 1.3 below). From 2000 onwards, price 
volatility increases and so does the average price. This has been explained by 
several factors, notably the uncertainty as to whether the European Commission 
would consider the CTCs as State Aids and hence ban them, and the tight 
capacity margins that arise due to the steep increase in demand coupled with the 
lack of new investments, and a sequence of cold winters and droughts (especially 
during the last months of 2001 and the first months of 2002). From 2002 
onwards, the surge in new investments, particularly in CCGTs, contributed to 
bring prices down.  
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Figure 2: The evolution of final prices in the Spanish Electricity Industry 
(c€/kWh), January 1998-June 2004 (Data source: OMEL) 
 
1.3. Competition Transition Costs (CTCs) 
 
Under the previous regulatory regime, firms took their investment 
decisions in the framework of a National Energy Plan (PEN) and their revenues 
                                                 
15 A closer look at the evolution of prices during 1998 shows the occurrence of five to six short 
periods of very low prices, even below the costs of the thermal plants. Fabra and Toro (2004) 
perform an empirical analysis of the pattern of prices and market shares. They find that the 
evidence is consistent with theories of tacit collusion under imperfect monitoring. In particular, 
they find that the periods of low prices are statistically and economically significant (i.e. 
unexplained by factors such as change in cost or hydro conditions), and that the signs and 
magnitudes of the trigger variables coincide with those expected by game theory. In particular, 
they find that an increase (reduction) in the market share of Endesa (Iberdrola) increases the 
likelihood of switching to a low price regime in the following period.  
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were set according to some pre-determined “standard costs” in ways that 
induced similar incentive properties as Yardstick Competition.16 The Law 
passed in 1997 entitled the incumbent generators to some additional payments 
to compensate them from their stranded costs,17 i.e. the difference (possibly 
negative) between the value of the standard costs and the expected payments 
that each of them would have in the market place. These payments were 
referred to as “Competition Transition Costs”.18 
 
1.3.1. The mechanism 
 
The ‘Protocol’ signed between the government and the electricity 
companies in December 1996 (see footnote 1) states that ‘the electricity 
companies shall receive during a transition period a fixed payment which shall be 
computed as the difference between the average revenues of the tariff and the 
regulated costs. The net present value of this amount will not exceed 1,988,561 
million pesetas (€11,951.49 Million). If the generation cost exceeded 3.61 
c€/kWh, the excess would be deducted from the above-mentioned amount’. 
These ‘Competition Transition Costs’, are computed as follows. In a 
given year, the total amount paid to the whole industry in terms of CTCs is the 
residual amount left after deducting from the tariff revenues the costs of the 
regulated activities (distribution and transmission), the subsidies to the 
consumption of national coal, and the costs incurred by the distribution 
companies from purchasing the electricity in the pool. Each generator entitled to 
these payments receives a fixed proportion of the residual amount: Endesa’s CTC 
share was set equal to 51.2%, Iberdrola’s was 27.1%, Unión Fenosa’s was 12.9% 
and Hidrocantábrico’s was 5.7%.19 In this way, the industry total revenues 
(summing market revenues and CTC payments) are fixed through the choice of 
                                                 
16 The “standard costs” were initially based on audited costs. However, regardless of any 
potential changes in actual costs, firms’ per-unit revenues were determined on the basis of the 
standard costs. Since any potential efficiency gains would not reduce their revenues, firms faced 
the right incentives to incur in cost-reducing activities. Furthermore, it was in the firms’ interest 
to report any cost reduction, as this would alter the merit order used by REE to determine the 
production of each individual unit. See Crampes and Laffont (1995) for more on this. Fabra-
Utray (2004) and Arocena and Waddams (2001) report evidence on the increase in productive 
efficiency achieved by the Spanish electricity generators from 1988 to 1998, while this scheme 
applied.  
17 The Energy Commission (CNSE, 1997) argued as follows: ‘the introduction of competition 
needs to be gradual, and firms need to be helped to adapt to the new situation. This aid should 
guarantee firms financial viability and be consistent with a decreasing pattern of the final tariff to 
consumers’.  
18 Capacity payments also contribute to cover firms stranded costs. However, whereas capacity 
payments are received by all available units, only the incumbent generators are entitled to 
receive CTCs.  
19 During 1999 only, the mechanism worked differently. The companies agreed to give 16% of 
the total CTC entitlement up in exchange to being allowed to cash 64% (€ 5.8 billion) by issuing 
an equivalent amount in securities on the market; the final tariff would include an extra 4.5% 
levied to support these costs. The remaining 20% would still be determined by difference, in the 
same way as described above.  
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the regulated tariff, regardless of the level of pool prices. Still, the companies are 
not indifferent about the level of prices, as long as their market shares differ from 
their CTC shares (see 1.3.2. below).  
Several objections were made to these payments. First, the government 
was criticized for the lack of transparency in the method used to compute them. 
Second, the regulatory authority chose an exogenous and fixed baseline price, 
3.61 c€/kWh, to compute the CTCs to be paid to all the plants, under the claim 
that it represented the expected costs of the marginal units (CCGTs) and hence 
the price in a competitive market. The expectation that the average price 
received by all plants would be 3.61 c€/kWh could only be a matter of luck: 
what if gas prices, an important determinant of the marginal costs of the 
peaking technologies, unexpectedly rose or decreased? What if the forecasts on 
demand, expected hydro, entry or capacity decisions were flawed? What if – as 
it is the case- the average price earned by the several technologies differed, due 
to their different positions in the load curve and number of hours during which 
each operates? What if the market did not drive prices to the system marginal 
cost? Pretending that 3.61 cents of €/kWh was based on any cost considerations 
was, at best, a leap of faith. Still, it has not been a matter of luck that prices 
have varied around the baseline price. Rather, it has been the almost inevitable 
outcome of the incentive structure- a matter that the authorities seemed to have 
overlooked, or at least, did not make explicit.  
 
What is then the effect of these payments on firms’ bidding incentives 
and why is it not surprising that the authorities’ predictions turned out to be so 
accurate? Would have it been inconsequential that the baseline price had been set 
at a different level?  
 
1.3.2. The effects of CTCs on bidding behaviour 
 
As described above, the incumbent generators have three main sources 
of revenues: market revenues, CTCs, and capacity payments. For the sake of 
simplicity we will only focus on the first two. A firm’s market revenues depend 
on its market share, and it is an increasing function of the pool price. A firm’s 
CTC payments, on the other hand, depend on its CTC share, and these are smaller 
the higher the pool prices (the residual amount left to distribute in terms of CTCs 
decreases as pool prices go up).  
The effects of CTCs on bidding behaviour are similar to the ones that 
arise in all markets where a major part of production is subject to ‘Contracts for 
Differences’ (see Newbery 1998). Establishing the analogy between the two is 
straightforward: a firm subject to CTC payments supplies its output in exchange 
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of the market price, and receives the difference between the ‘contract price’, i.e. 
the regulated tariff, and the market price, for the ‘quantity contracted’, which is 
given by its allocated CTC share. Formally this can be written as 
 
)()( iiiii qCQppq −−+= ατπ     (1) 
 
where the profit of firm i, denoted iπ , is expressed as a function of the 
pool price p, firm i’s production qi, the regulated tariff paid by final consumers τ, 
the total quantity demanded Q, firm i’s CTC share αi and firm i’s cost function Ci. 
Dividing the above equation by total quantity Q, we can express it in terms of 
firm i’s market share 
def
i
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We see that an increase in the pool price p has a positive effect on the 
firm’s profits that is proportional to its market share, mi, and a negative effect that 
is proportional to its CTC share, αi. Thus, whether a firm is better off or worse off 
when the pool price increases depends on the difference between its market share 
and its CTC share, im α− . If this difference is positive, the firm stands at a net 
selling position and hence it is better off the higher pool prices are. On the 
contrary, if this difference is negative, an increase in pool prices reduces the 
firm’s CTC revenues more than it increases its market revenues. Hence, firms 
face a conflict of interest as to the level of prices. 
The recent debate in the sector has made this conflict explicit. Iberdrola 
(whose CTC share is below its market share, and who has already recovered most 
of its CTC entitlement) and Gas Natural (with no CTC entitlement) have 
advocated for the elimination of the CTC payments, while the remaining 
companies (specially, Endesa, whose CTC share largely exceeds its market share 
and who has not still recovered a large fraction of its CTC entitlement) have 
opposed it (see EL PAIS, November 18, 2003 and July 29-30, 2004).20 
Furthermore, Iberdrola’s incentives to get rid of the price-cap implied in the 
CTCs are enhanced by the fact that it reduces the ability of its hydro units from 
exploiting their competitive advantage. 
                                                 
20 The divergence between market shares and CTC shares across companies is explained by the 
type of technology units they own. For instance, Endesa was entitled to receive more stranded 
costs and was expected to receive fewer market revenues given that its technology mix is mainly 
thermal, whereas the contrary was true for Iberdrola, with a large hydro capacity.   
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Using a similar specification, it is possible to derive a firm’s profit 
maximizing supply function, i.e. price-quantity pairs that maximize a firm’s 
profits for all the possible realizations of the residual demand function that it 
might face (see Fabra and Toro 2004). The intersection between the firm’s profit-
maximizing supply functions and its residual demand must be at points such that 
the following condition is satisfied:  
i
ii
i
i
m
m
p
cp α
γ
−
=
− 1
     (3) 
where ci is the firm’s marginal cost, and γi is the elasticity of the residual 
demand curve faced by the firm. Note that the above equation implies that a firm 
will optimally operate at prices below marginal costs whenever its CTC share 
exceeds its market share, and at prices above marginal costs otherwise. 
This fact has also created some controversy in the sector. Gas Natural 
has recently complained that “wholesale prices are being manipulated …, and are 
set below costs”; “even though Gas Natural has not mentioned a single company, 
it has implicitly accused Endesa and, to a lesser extent, Fenosa and 
Hidrocantábrico” (see EL PAIS July 29-30, 2004). Following these complaints, 
the National Energy Commission, CNE, has agreed to open up an investigation 
(see EL PAIS, August 13, 2004). Our analysis suggests that what Gas Natural has 
denounced as an anticompetitive practice, is just the outcome of the incentive 
structure created by the CTCs.  
The way in which the CTCs were computed had two further effects on 
firms’ bidding incentives. First, the Law fixed a maximum amount of CTCs to be 
earned over the transition period. This implicitly set a price floor, as the reduction 
of prices below the level that would result in firms receiving the maximum 
entitlement would not be compensated by an increase in CTCs. Second, the Law 
also established that all the revenues exceeding 3.61 c€/kWh would be deducted 
from a firm’s maximum entitlement. Clearly, this played the same role as an 
implicit price cap (and hence a focal price) as long as firms believed in the 
government’s commitment to pay all the CTC entitlement during the transition 
period. Indeed, in 1999, when the European Commission questioned the legality 
of the CTCs under the consideration that they were State Aids, this mechanism 
lost effect and prices started to increase (see Figure 2).21  
 
1.3.3. The future of CTCs  
 
                                                 
21 The controversy over the CTCs ended on July 25, 2001, when the European Commission 
(Filings NN/49/99 on “Regimen Transitorio del Mercado de Electricidad”) stated that, “… even 
if the CTC mechanism could include state aid elements … the Commission considers that such 
elements would be compatible with the EU Treaty”. 
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The likely evolution of prices once the transition period ends in 2010 
remains an open question. So far, mark-ups have not been excessive (they have 
even been negative at times, see Fabra and Toro 2004) because of two main 
reasons. First, as already argued, prices have been implicitly capped through 
CTC payments. And second, given that the regulated tariffs for final consumers 
are relatively low, those consumers that participate directly into the pool have a 
safeguard and can always go back to the tariff as soon as wholesale prices 
increase. This has implied an extra (implicit) cap on wholesale prices.   
 
However, once the CTC mechanism comes to an end (and once the 
regulated tariffs to final consumers disappear), a market that is dominated by 
two large producers controlling more than 80% of total production should result 
in high prices. The question is whether this will be sustainable, taking into 
account that a great part of consumers will still be subject to regulated tariffs.22 
Given the past experience and the history of governmental interventionism, the 
question is: which new regulatory measure will the government add to the so-
called market to restrain firms from raising prices? 
 
In this context of uncertainty and controversy regarding the CTCs, the 
Kyoto agreement has come into play. By 2008-2010, the implementation of the 
Kyoto agreement will change the operating costs of the thermal plants, as these 
will have to partially internalize the costs of emissions (net of the emission 
rights that they will receive at zero cost). This will have several effects on the 
performance of the market. On one hand, this increase in costs will most likely 
lead to an increase in the equilibrium prices, which are used to determine the 
payments received by every despatched unit. Furthermore, the current merit-
order will be altered, and this will change the expected production of the 
different technology units. Hence, the hydro and nuclear units will increase their 
ability to recover their stranded costs through the market, whereas the 
conventional thermal units will reduce their ability to recoup them in ways that 
were unforeseeable at the time the amount of the CTC entitlement was set. 
Consequently, the implementation of the Kyoto agreement will invalidate the 
criteria used by the authorities to determine the total amount of CTCs and its 
distribution across companies, set seven years ago. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
observation has been absent from the debate about the implementation of the 
Kyoto agreement. Had this issue been raised, it would have opened up a real 
                                                 
22 Since 2003, all consumers are free to choose their electricity retailer. However, switching rates 
are very modest. In 2003, 99.73% of consumers were under the tariff system and consumed 69% 
of the total energy. The remaining 0.27% of consumers purchased their electricity in the 
liberalised market and consumed 31% of the energy (Comisión Nacional de la Energía, 2004).  
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Pandora’s Box of issues related to the lack of robustness of the current 
regulatory regime.  
 
1.4. Evolution of the market structure 
 
The structure of the Spanish electricity market has been subject to an 
intense process of change during the last decade. Nowadays, there are four main 
electricity companies, two of which, Endesa and Iberdrola, control 80% of the 
generation and distribution assets. There is also a high degree of vertical 
integration23 and tight links between the Spanish electricity generators and the 
primary fuel providers (coal, gas and oil).24  
Figures 3 and 4 depict firms’ market shares in the Day-Ahead Market 
from May 2001 to April 2004, both from the supply side (generation) and from 
the demand side (distribution, retailing and pumping storage). 25 We can see that 
the incumbent firms remain dominant over the period. Endesa and Iberdrola’s 
market shares decrease slightly, and Unión Fenosa’s and Hidrocantábrico’s 
remain stable. The small firms (both in generation as well as in retailing) manage 
to slightly increase their market shares over time. Among these, the most 
important ones are Viesgo (whose assets were divested from Endesa) and Gas 
Natural.  
Prior to 1998, the industry was considerably more fragmented than it 
currently is. The regulatory uncertainty, coupled with the government’s explicit 
support,26 strengthened firms’ merger incentives. Both Endesa – a public 
company at that time – and Iberduero (the predecessor of Iberdrola) embarked on 
an aggressive policy of acquisitions and take-overs of their smaller competitors. 
Endesa acquired a myriad of regional electricity companies (ENHER, Unelco, 
GESA, ERZ, Electra de Viesgo, Saltos del Nansa, and Sevillana de Electricidad), 
whereas Iberduero merged with Hidrola (leading to the creation of Iberdrola).  
 
                                                 
23 An important feature that is worth emphasising is that distribution operators remain strictly 
regulated in all respects- i.e. not only as owners of the ‘wires’ but also as buyers and sellers of 
electricity (see section 2.2 below). The fact that distributors charge a regulated rate to final 
consumers and buy electricity from the pool at the equilibrium market price should not lead to 
conclude that, as in other markets, distributors have a potential profit margin to make from 
buying energy at prices below the default rate. This is important to determine firms’ net-
positions, and hence their bidding incentives. Needless to say, this does not imply that vertical 
integration is innocuous. For instance, through the effect of switching costs, the customers of the 
distribution companies will likely become captive customers of their subsidiary retailers, thus 
giving the incumbent firms a competitive advantage over new entrants.  
24 Some electricity generators own coal mines, have shares in gas and oil companies, and are 
directly involved in the construction of pipelines and refineries. Furthermore, their objective is to 
become active players in the gas market. For instance, Iberdrola’s objective for 2006 is to control 
20% of the gas market (see Iberdrola’s corporate web page). 
25 Market share data are not available for previous periods. 
26 In 1996, the government allowed Endesa to merge with Sevillana de Electricidad and FECSA 
in order to increase its value before privatization.  
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Figure 3: Firms' market shares on the supply side in the Spanish day-ahead 
market, May 2001-April 2004. (Data source: OMEL) 
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Figure 4: Firms' market shares on the demand side (distribution, retailing, pump 
storage) in the Spanish day-ahead market, May 2001-April 2004. (Data 
source: OMEL) 
 
The process of mergers, acquisitions, and alliances, did not end after the 
change in the regulatory regime. In 2000, Unión Fenosa launched a hostile take-
over over its smaller competitor, Hidrocantábrico. The Government, following 
the reports by the Energy Commission and the Competition Court, did not 
approve the take-over, arguing that it would weaken competition. Up to very 
recently, Hidrocantábrico has been subject to a continuous process of buy-outs 
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and alliances: it was first bought by Electricidade de Portugal (40%) and EnBW 
(35%), and since July 2004, EdP controls 95% of Hidrocantábrico after acquiring 
EnBW’s stocks (see EL PAIS, July 30, 2004). 
In October 2000, Endesa and Iberdrola planned to merge. The objective 
was two-fold. The firms sought to obtain some liquidity without losing their 
strategic position; they also tried to diversify their business towards other areas of 
economic activity and towards international markets.27 The parties themselves 
accepted that significant divestments of generation and distribution assets were 
necessary to conform with regulatory and competition policy requirements. They 
proposed to sell some 16,000 MW of generation capacity, and hence retain 
approximately 50% of total industry capacity, in addition to divesting a small 
proportion of their distribution assets, and to reducing their share in the retail 
supply market. The merger proposal then opened an interesting debate on the set 
of ex ante constraints that should be placed on the asset divestments to ensure 
that the merger/divestment process would not weaken competition. In particular, 
the emphasis was on two sets of questions: Should smaller firms in the market be 
permitted to purchase significant shares of these assets, or should the assets be 
mainly reserved for new entrants? What should be the mix of technologies 
retained by the merged firm? These questions were not given a clear-cut answer 
as the government, after consultation with the Competition Court and the Energy 
Commission, required severe remedies which made the plan unprofitable from 
the point of view of the merging companies. Consequently, Endesa and Iberdrola 
decided to withdraw their plan. 
On March 10, 2003, the public bid that Gas Natural launched for 100% 
of Iberdrola’s shares re-opened the controversy concerning mergers in the 
Spanish electricity industry. Iberdrola is the second largest firm in the electricity 
sector and is the one with the most balanced technology mix. Iberdrola’s hydro 
capacity confers on it the ability to greatly influence market prices and places it 
in a dominant position in the market. Gas Natural is the dominant player in the 
gas sector, controlling 70% of the market. Also, it has been the main ‘new’ 
entrant into the electricity sector, with a strong commitment to invest in CCGTs 
and to fiercely compete at the retail level by bundling electricity and gas.  
 The merger proposal, which would have resulted in the fifth largest 
energy company in the world, with a € 33 billion total stock value, thus 
represented an ambitious attempt to vertically integrate both the gas and 
electricity sectors. The National Energy Commission decided to block the merger 
                                                 
27 Supporting this claim is the fact that, once the Competition authorities modified the merger 
project, Endesa sold through an auction its company Electra de Viesgo (2,500 MW in generation 
assets, and distribution and transmission assets associated with 500,000 customers). 
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authorisation on the basis that it would have had a deep impact on the regulated 
gas and electricity distribution sectors.28  
 
1.5. Investment in generation capacity and resource adequacy 
 
The change in the regulatory regime not only implied that transactions 
would be organized through market mechanisms, but also that investment 
decisions would no longer be defined in the framework of the National Energy 
Plan. Market participants alone now face the full risk and cost of their investment 
decisions.29 
The new regulatory environment inherited the uneconomic excess 
capacity that was built during the previous regulatory regime. Still, capacity 
reserves have been rapidly absorbed due to the steep increase in demand over the 
recent years (see Figure 1) and the lack of new investment. Two facts stand out as 
possible  causes. First, the regulatory uncertainty induced firms to ‘wait and see’ 
before building any new generation plant. And second, the Royal Decree 6/2000 
did not allow the incumbent generators with shares above 30% to construct new 
plants. As the experience has demonstrated, this was a regulatory mistake that 
delayed the operation of new plants (mainly, by Endesa) precisely when they 
were most needed.  
During the winter of 2000-2001, a particularly humid season (20% 
above the historical average) hid the tight capacity margins under which the 
system was operating. However, a particularly cold and dry winter drove 
electricity demand above installed capacity. On the 17th of December 2001, the 
problems became public knowledge when the System Operator had to force 
rolling blackouts in the central region of Spain in order to avoid the collapse of 
the system. The deep and well-founded worry that the stability of the system was 
still at risk, allowed the regulatory authorities to request firms to carry about all 
the investment plans that had previously been announced (probably, some of 
these announcements were not backed by a real commitment but rather, 
responded to strategic reasons). In 2002, 2.800 MW of new capacity entered into 
operation, 800 belonging to Iberdrola and 800 to Gas Natural. These, together 
with an exceptionally intense humid season, contributed to cover the peak of 
demand that was registered during the last days of 2002 and the first months of 
2003 (on January 14, 2003, demand peaked at 37.000 MW). In 2003, three new 
CCGT plants have increased the total installed capacity by 1600 MW. 
                                                 
28 Since very recently, Endesa and Gas Natural are involved in merger talks. The Ministers of 
Economics and Industry have openly declared that they would not be against it (see EL PAIS, 
May 28, 2004). 
29 Investments in generation are subject to administrative licensing, which requires that the 
investor shows expertise and financial viability, and meets safety and environmental criteria. 
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Parallel to the experience in other electricity markets, the bust in the 
investment cycle has been followed by a boom, which is based on the 
construction of new CCGT plants (see Table 1). They offer the best prospects 
among all the technologies available to the Spanish electricity generators, not 
only in terms of their average costs, but also in the light of the reduction of 
emissions needed to comply with the Kyoto agreement. It is thus not surprising 
that Gas Natural, which benefits from its activity in the gas market, has been one 
of the first and most active operators in building new plants. The incumbent 
firms’ incentives to invest in CCGT plants are also extremely powerful. From the 
point of view of the large incumbent firms, losing the opportunity to invest would 
mean a loss in dimension, relative size, and most certainly, competitiveness. The 
smaller companies, Hidrocantábrico and Union Fenosa, need to invest in order to 
improve their position in a system that is close to being a duopoly, as well as to 
protect their independence.  
 
 
Owner Year in which the CCGT plants become available 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
ENDESA ----- 400 400 1,200 
IBERDROLA 1,600 1,200 800 800 
UNIÓN FENOSA ---- 1,200 2,400 800 
HIDROCANTÁBRICO ---- ---- 800 400 
GAS NATURAL 800 ----- 3,200 800 
OTHERS 800 2,285 3,085 5,200 
TOTAL 3,200 5,085 10,685 9,200 
 
Table 1: CCGTs Construction Plans in the Spanish Electricity System (MW). (Source: CNE) 
 
 
Still, even this surge in investment does not seem to be enough to 
absorb the expected increase in demand. The estimates based on the new 
investment plans and forecasted demand, show that the ratio of the reserve 
margin over the installed capacity is expected to shrink below its current level 
by 2010 (from 6.5% nowadays to 4.6 % in 2010 as shown in Table 2). While it 
is true that there is time to start the construction of new plants that could be 
ready by 2010, the recent experience has shown an artificial inflation of 
projects, in the sense that not all the construction plans for which authorisations 
have been requested have actually gone through. At this point, it is unclear 
which of these two effects will dominate. This situation could be improved by 
the development of interconnection capacity, especially with France. But this is 
highly unlikely, as the next section argues. 
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 2004 2006 2008 2010
Power Data (GW)
Hydro 22,5  22,8  22,9  23,2  
Nuclear 7,6  7,6  7,5  7,6  
Thermal 31,4  35,2  37,3  39,3  
Renewable 6,6  10,1  12,9  15,9  
Intalled Capacity 68,1  75,7  80,6  86,0  
 Guaranteed Capacity 51,5  55,7  58,2  60,1  
 Load 47,1  49,8  52,8  56,1  
Reserve Margin 4,4  5,8  5,4  4,0  
Interconnection capacity (with France 
and Portugal)
1,8  2,4  3,0  4,1  
R. Margin/ I. Capacity (%) 6,5% 7,7% 6,7% 4,6%
Inter. Cap./ I. Capacity (%) 2,6% 3,2% 3,7% 4,8%
R. Marg.+Inter. Cap./I. Cap. (%) 9,0% 10,8% 10,4% 9,4%  
 
Table 2: Installed Capacity, Load, and Reserve Margins in Spain and Portugal (Source: 
UCTE)  
 
 
2. NETWORK ACTIVITIES: INTERCONNECTION, TRANSMISSION 
AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
In this section, we will explain how the Spanish grid is connected to the 
neighbouring systems (section 2.1) and the economic principles that command 
the operation of the transmission and distribution activity (section 2.2). 
  
2.1. Interconnection 
 
In the former organizational framework, where competition was not the 
industry’s driver, interconnectors were mainly viewed as security devices. Most 
national or regional electric systems were independent from each other and 
interconnection links had been designed to help bordering systems in case of 
emergency. Of course, since the links were available, they also were used under 
normal circumstances. In Spain, imported energy was already part of the centrally 
despatched resources in the pre-1998 system. Symmetrically, the interconnectors 
remain emergency devices under the new organizational framework. For 
example, in December 2000, after the storm that isolated the South-west part of 
France from the remaining part of the French grid, the Spanish electricity 
generators contributed to the stability of the damaged Southern French network 
and to the supply of energy to the French consumers.  
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In the new liberalized framework, competitive pressure should come 
either from the multiplication of independent generators (possibly through 
mandatory divestiture) or from abroad, thanks to interconnectors. However, in 
Spain competition cannot arise from abroad. Indeed, when Unión Fenosa tried to 
absorb Hidrocantábrico in 2000 and when Endesa tried to absorb Iberdrola in 
2001 (see section 1.4 above), the Competition Court (Tribunal de Defensa de la 
Competencia) rejected the merger plans on the basis of a narrow definition of the 
relevant market: “it may be that, in the long run, the geographical relevant market 
will be the Iberian peninsula; at the moment, it is limited to the Spanish 
peninsula”. Since these decisions, things have evolved institutionally, but not 
technically. Essentially, the Spanish electricity market remains isolated (see 
Figure 5).30 In 2003, imports represented 4.3 % (8,547 GWh) of the total 
electricity production,31 which is a small number compared to the share of the 
four large electricity generators. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Commercial capacity of interconnections (% of installed capacity)  
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The European directive 96/92 states that Network Operators determine 
the use of interconnectors on the basis of objective, transparent and non 
discriminatory criteria, which is not easy to implement when network operators 
belong to national incumbents, big vertically integrated generators. No 
unbundling is required for ownership, only independent management and 
accountancy. Anticompetitive allocation of interconnectors is under the threat of 
articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty,32 but competition restrictions could be 
unavoidable to recoup the costs of the investment in new links. The new 
European regulation on cross-border exchanges in electricity (EC 1228/2003) 
                                                 
30 In Figure 5, commercial capacity is defined as physical capacity less security capacity. Note 
that the connection with Morocco is exclusively used for exports. 
31 On the average, 8 % of European electricity trade is executed through interconnectors. 
32 The European Commission has examined the use of interconnection capacity between France 
and Spain. 
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edicts general principles on the building and the management of 
interconnectors, in particular regarding the rules of access and the use of the 
revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection. It allows some 
exemptions from regulation for independent investors in new interconnectors 
and in significant increases of capacity in existing interconnectors. The 
exemptions are conditional to the fact that “the investment must enhance 
competition in electricity supply”. This is an explicit acknowledgement that it is 
competition in energy supply that matters, not competition in the use of a 
specific type of equipment, local or remote. 
 
2.1.1. Interconnection between Spain and France 
 
The interconnection between Spain and France takes place through 
two 400 kV lines, two 220 kV lines, one 132 kV line and one 110 kV line. The 
interconnector capacity with France could be much larger than it currently is.33 
Actually, several projects have been abandoned or delayed because of political 
decisions taken under the pressure of environmental activists.  
The best known case is the abandonment in 1996 of the 400 kV line 
planned to cross the central Pyrenees, which proved to be highly damaging for 
the Spanish electricity system (Fabra Utray 2004, p. 341). After the breach of 
the contract signed between Red Eléctrica and Electricité de France, EDF was 
obliged to pay compensatory fines to REE, which amounted to €1.81 Billion 
payable from 1997 to 2010. The breach of the contract also obliged EDF to 
upgrade the existing lines as well as to decrease the coefficients of the two-part 
tariff paid by REE to buy electricity from France. These two elements 
contributed to the reduction in the Spanish wholesale electricity prices. 
The agreement signed between REE and EDF also included a 
commitment to build a new interconnection line before 2006. If the line was not 
opened in December 2006, it was agreed that the firm responsible for the delay 
would compensate the other with an annual payment of €8.26 Million during 
the following ten years. Given the opposition of the French public opinion,34 it 
seems quite likely that the line will not be built.35  
 
2.1.2. The ‘Tripartite Agreement’: REE, EDF and EDP 
                                                 
33 See the forecast for 2010 in Table 2. 
34 On the project of a very high voltage line across the eastern part of the frontier between France 
and Spain, see Commission Nationale du Débat Public, http://www.debat-liaison-tht-france-
espagne.com (all files are in French). 
35 Contrary to official announcements, it is not true that the construction of this line was decided 
in 2001 to counter-balance EnBW’s stake (a subsidiary of EDF) in Hidrocantábrico. The 
building of the line was already decided since the 1997 REE-EDF agreement, while the financial 
operation of EnBW had been cleared by the European Commission in pursuance of the 1989 text 
on merger regulation. 
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 It is noteworthy that in 1990, REE, EDF and EDP signed an agreement 
for exchanging energy. Under this agreement, EDF opened access to 385 MW 
of capacity to REE, whereas REE opened access to 301 MW of capacity to EDP 
(excluding at most 200 hours per year of interruption). This tripartite agreement 
was necessary to implement any bilateral agreement between France and 
Portugal given the intermediary position of Spain. Also in 1990, France and 
Spain reached an agreement by which REE was free to access to 1000 MW of 
capacity (now reduced to 500 MW) as if REE were a French domestic 
subscriber. This was the first international contract based on virtual capacity, 
i.e. on the whole French electricity system rather than on the energy provided 
by some specific plants (Fabra Utray 2004, p. 184-5 
 
2.1.3. The Iberian Electricity Market 
 
On the 14th of November 2001, the Portuguese and Spanish 
governments signed an agreement aimed at progressively creating a single 
market, named the Iberian Electricity Market (Mibel). The Mibel was expected to 
start operating in April 2004 (but the opening has been delayed until July 2005), 
with the objective to guarantee all agents established in both countries access to 
the Iberian Market Operator (Omel and its Portuguese counterpart, Omip, are 
expected to merge into the Omi by April 2006) and to the interconnections with 
third countries under free and equal bilateral trading conditions Interconnection 
between Spain and Portugal takes place through two 400 kV and three 220 kV 
lines, which can take up to a maximum 3300 MW in thermal capacity.36 The 
indicative value of the capacity available for commercial purposes varies, 
according to the system operators, between 550 MW (summer, from Portugal to 
Spain) and 850 MW (winter, from Spain to Portugal). The values recorded during 
2001 fell somewhere between 50 MW and 1500 MW. The “Collaboration 
Protocol” on Mibel does not consider the possibility of relying on one single 
transmission operator. Red Eléctrica de España (REE) and Rede Eléctrica 
Nacional (REN) have to coordinate the planning and expansion of the 
transmission networks, as well as to harmonize the operation procedures, 
particularly the resolution of congestion.  
 
2.2. Transmission and distribution 
 
                                                 
36 For details, see CNE and ERSE (2002). 
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The Spanish electricity network is made of 53,716 km of transmission 
lines.37 Red Electrica de España (REE) has been the main transmission owner 
since it was created in 1985, owning 98% of the 400 kV lines and 26%-36% of 
the 220 kV lines until 2002, when it further acquired the 220 kV lines belonging 
to Endesa and Unión Fenosa. Iberdrola’s transmission network was sold to a 
subsidiary of Red de Alta Tensión (Redalta) but REE reached an agreement by 
which it became the owner of 25% of Redalta. To prevent abuse of dominant 
position (REE is a private firm),38 Red Eléctrica has to respect and enforce the 
procedures for access to the transmission grid as defined by the Royal Decree 
1955/2000. The other main relevant texts are the Royal Decree 2819/1998 that 
defines the economic scope of transmission and distribution activities in order 
to guarantee a high degree of service quality and the Royal Decree 1164/2001 
that fixes the tariff rules for access to the networks of transmission and 
distribution of electricity. 
The regulation system for transmission and distribution is based on 
average-price cap. The formula for rewarding transmission and distribution 
firms as well as the formula for the prices to be paid by users are fixed 
administratively.  
 
A. Consider first the revenue of the network operators. 
 A.1 The revenue of the transmission firm i in year t is39 
it it it itR R I N= + +      (4) 
where itR  is the cost corresponding to the equipment of firm i installed up to 
December 1997 and globally re-evaluated by a RPI X−  factor with 
 for each year during the period 2003-2006 (  is the acronym 
for Retail Price Index). Table 3 shows the initial value for the cost ( = revenue) 
of transmission firm i in 1988, i.e.
0.6X = % RPI
,1998iR .  
 itI  stands for the cumulative cost corresponding to the equipment 
installed between 1998 and . Each item is re-evaluated by the same 
factor , 
1t −
RP XI −
 N  is an incentive revenue paid to firm i in year t to reward the 
availability of its equipment during year t . 
it
1−
                                                 
37 These are figures on December 31, 2003. The length are respectively 16 560 Km at 400 kV, 
16 242 at 220 kV and 20 914 at 132-110 kV. 
38 The capital of REE is mainly held by SEPI, a public firm (28.5%), and the four largest 
generators (Endesa, Iberdrola, Hidrocantábrico and Unión Fenosa, each for 3%, i.e. the legal 
cap). The remaining 59.5% is free float in the Spanish stock market. 
39 For details, see article 4 of the Royal Decree 2819/1998. 
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Starting from 507 M€ in 1998 (see Table 3), the transmission costs 
have reached 833 M€ in 2004 (of which 625 M€ are for Red Eléctrica de 
España). After Article 7 of the mentioned Royal Decree, the costs 
corresponding to new equipments include “costs necessary to develop the 
transmission activity”.  
 
A.2 For distributors as a whole, the revenue in year t is given by 
1 (1 ) (1 )dt dt
DR R RPI F
D−
∆
= × + × + ×    (5) 
Table 3: Transmission costs, as set in 1998 ( ,1998iR  in millions of euros) 
Source: Annex 1 of RD 2819/1998. 
 Transmission firm i M€ Percentage 
Iberdrola, S.A. 
Unión Eléctrica Fenosa, S.A. 
Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad, S.A. 
Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña, S.A. 
Empresa Hidroeléctrica del Ribagorzana, S.A. 
Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, S.A. 
Electra de Viesgo, S.A. 
Eléctricas Reunidas de Zaragoza, S.A. 
Endesa, S.A. 
Red Eléctrica de España, S.A. 
79.32 
25.59 
31.81 
19.53 
24.49 
2.55 
4.89  
6.39  
5.43  
307.24 
15,64 
5,05 
6,27 
3,85 
4,82 
0,50 
0,96 
1,26 
1,07 
60,57 
Total 507.24 100,00 
 
where 
D
D
∆
0.4≤
 is the rate of increase in demand (or 0 if there occurs a decrease) 
and  is an efficiency factor. According to Article 21 of RD 2819/1998, 
the share of this total amount allocated to each distributor is decided yearly by 
the energy ministry (see Table 4). Actually, the allocation procedure is far from 
discretionary. It follows some established rules such that the share to each 
distributor is fairly stable from year to year.  
F
Table 4: Distribution revenues in 2004 (millions of euros) 
Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica, S. A. U. 
Unión Fenosa Distribución, S. A. 
Hidrocantábrico Distribución Eléctrica, S. A. 
Electra de Viesgo I, S. A. 
Endesa 
Sociedad Coop. Valenciana Ltda. Benéfica de Consumo de 
Electricidad San Francisco de Asís 
1.042.952
477.749
90.062
79.783
1.132.736
124
Total 2.823.406
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Source: Annex VIII of RD 1802/2003. 
 
These two reward schemes have an incentive component. For 
transmission, incentives come from the fact that operators are residual 
beneficiaries of any cost reduction below the revenue cap. For distribution, note 
that an increase in demand does not provoke a proportional increase in revenue. 
This is not surprising since an increase in demand does not create the need to 
increase the distribution costs by the same amount. In these network activities, 
most costs are fixed. Hence, absent structural congestions, extra demand can be 
accommodated with the same equipment, i.e. at a low cost. The efficiency 
component of the revenue mechanism relies on the possibility for the revenue-
setter to arbitrarily fix the weight of the demand increase, F, as long as it is not 
above 40%. This type of mechanism probably explains why distributors have 
become more efficient, as Griffel-Tatjé and Lovell (2003) have shown by 
comparing observed costs of distribution and virtual costs derived from an ideal 
network designed without the burden of history. An additional reason is that the 
revenue mechanism does not provide explicit revenues to promote investment,40 
so that distributors have the incentive to accommodate more demand without 
developing their lines. This lack of incentive to invest is efficient in the short 
run when the networks are oversized, but it will be damageable in the long run 
if it results in structural congestion. 
 
B. We now consider the tariff paid by the users of the network. The Law 
54/1997 that liberalized the electricity industry sets that (at least) yearly the 
government fixes the average or reference tariff (art. 17). The basic definition of 
the tariffs appears in the Royal Decree 1164/2001 and the 2004 tariffs are set by 
Royal Decree 1802/2003. The access prices vary with voltage level and are 
made of an energy term and a power term.41 The low voltage tariff (below 1kV) 
distinguishes a “simple tariff” (for power below 15kW) with an optional peak 
/off-peak hour system and a “general tariff” where the energy and the power 
terms of the bill can take three different values depending on time and season. 
In the high voltage tariff (between 1kV and 36kV), users of the transmission 
network with a contractual power below 450 kW pay tariffs that vary according 
to three periods. Above 450 kW or above 36kV, users of the grid are subject to 
a six-period tariff with very high differences depending on hours and seasons. 
All these access tariffs are computed to recoup the variable cost for 
transmitting and distributing electricity, plus a series of fixed costs, either born 
                                                 
40 Article 18 of RD 2819/1998 loosely refers to a ministry decision to design an incentive 
mechanism for the development of the distribution network. 
41 Plus, if relevant, a term for reactive energy. 
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by the transmission and distribution companies or attributable to general 
services (OMEL, CNE, CTC, etc), plus the extra cost due to the "Special 
Regime" (cogeneration and renewable energy).  
Given the importance of fixed costs, the (second) best solution should 
consist of either Ramsey linear prices or non linear tariffs.42 As they are, the 
Spanish tariffs look like a tentative to mimic both. Indeed, Ramsey prices are 
highly discriminatory since they would allocate all the costs of the network in 
proportion to the inverse of the elasticity of demand. Charging Ramsey prices 
would result in high unit prices for energy and transmission paid by households 
and low unit prices for industrial consumers since the former are less price-
responsive than the latter. But discrimination is forbidden by Law. One solution 
could be to allocate all the costs at the same price, with the effect to decrease 
the social performance since there is the additional constraint to make all prices 
equal. Rather, the traditional solution is based on "cost causality". It consists in 
separating the electricity grid into several components (e.g. high voltage and 
low voltage equipment) and to allocate the costs only to the users that can be 
identified. Since the large consumers only use the high voltage grid, they only 
have to pay for the costs of the high voltage grid. In contrast, the households 
receive energy that has been transmitted through all the wires; therefore, they 
must pay for all the infrastructure costs. As compared with second best, here 
again there is a decrease in the social performance since there are now several 
budget constraints instead of one. Which system is less damageable for the 
society depends on many parameters. Here we just observe that the standard 
practice of cost-causality is not the only solution. And it has the effect to charge 
different prices. At best, we can interpret the segmentation of clients on the 
basis of the voltage connection as a tentative to approximate the price 
differential that would result from second best prices.  
Consider now the energy and power components of the tariff. Efficient 
pricing would command hourly prices for both energy and transmission. Only 
very large consumers have meters able to keep the track of hourly consumption. 
For most consumers, only cumulated consumption is metered. With standard 
meters, the operators are unable to distinguish between a consumer who 
withdraws 1 kW of energy during each hour of the day and the consumer who 
withdraws 24 kW during one hour and 0 kW during the remaining 23 hours. 
Yet, the two types of consumers create different costs of generation and 
transmission. The capacity term of the tariff is aimed at discriminating among 
them. For a given quantity of energy, “irregular consumers” must be charged 
proportionally more than regular consumers. If the energy component of the 
                                                 
42 See Crampes (2003). 
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tariff is the same for all, the capacity component must be increasing with 
capacity. In the above example, the unit price of capacity paid by the irregular 
consumer must be larger than 24 times the unit price of capacity paid by the 
regular consumer. But it is also possible to charge a higher price of energy 
combined with a less than proportional price of capacity.  
Note that these tariffs with two components (energy and capacity) are 
incorrectly named two-part tariffs. Actually, they are multi-linear prices without 
any fixed component. Adding a true fixed part, depending neither on energy nor 
on capacity, would give an additional degree of freedom to operators to 
approximate second best pricing.  
 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
In 1997, the Spanish Government agreed with the electricity 
companies to reform the electricity industry. Regulation, it was claimed, would 
be replaced by competition, and this alone would drive electricity prices down 
and would allow market participants to make more efficient investment and 
consumption decisions. However, as we have argued in the preceding 
paragraphs, the so-called market, as it has been implemented, is not such. 
Regardless of market prices, what consumers end up paying and firms receiving 
is ultimately determined by regulated tariffs, which are set by the government 
on an annual basis, and in a non-transparent manner. Also, the new system has 
failed in attracting new entry, and in promoting the efficient amount of 
investment needed to guarantee adequate reserve margins. The government has 
additionally undermined attempts to change the market rules and has blocked 
several merger proposals. Some have viewed this as a lost opportunity to 
enhance competition, as it could have been used to de-concentrate the market 
structure through the imposition of adequate divestment requirements on the 
merging firms.  
We would like to close this paper by highlighting a series of critical 
topics concerning the current and future performance of the industry. 
 
Governmental Interventionism 
Governmental interventionism and lack of transparency have reigned 
in the Spanish electricity market over the recent years. Instances of this are the 
determination of the Competition Transition Costs (CTCs) on the basis of fuzzy 
criteria, the payment of a capacity payment at a rate which is periodically 
changed in a non-transparent manner, the settlement through the CTC system of 
an implicit price cap on the energy traded in the pool, and the systematic policy 
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against mergers (Unión Fenosa- Hidrocantábrico, Endesa-Iberdrola, Iberdrola-
Gas Natural, etc).  
 
Generators’ Market Power 
Several anticompetitive practices aimed at altering the competitive 
equilibria in the wholesale market have been observed. For instance, in 1998, 
the pattern of prices was characterized by the occurrence of five to seven price 
wars, unrelated to cost shifts, which can only be explained on the basis of 
strategic considerations (Fabra and Toro 2004). Similarly, during 1999, the 
response of prices to the conflict arising from Brussels regarding the legality of 
the CTCs showed that firms were able to alter the market equilibrium through 
their bidding strategies. Very recently, (see EL PAIS and Cinco Días, July 8, 
2004), the Competition Court has imposed the maximum fine on Endesa, 
Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa for abuse of dominant position on November 2001, 
when wholesale prices tripled with respect to their normal level. The Court 
argued that those firms had made use of their local market power by bidding 
higher prices when the transmission lines were congested.43 While this episode 
might be regarded as an anecdote, it provides an extreme example of firms’ 
ability to exercise market power. Arguably, further attempts to exercise market 
power may have been mitigated by the implicit price caps imposed by the CTCs 
and the regulated tariffs. However, the question remains as to the 
competitiveness of the market once the CTC mechanism comes to an end and 
the regulated tariffs disappear. Furthermore, the efforts of the National Energy 
Commission (CNE) to implement market reforms that limit the ability of the 
main producers to exercise unilateral market power have been undermined by 
the Government (Wolak 2004).  
 
Entry 
Entry has been dissuaded by the incumbent firms. This has mainly 
been achieved by the strategic announcement of new investment plants that 
have never been carried out. The existence of CTCs has represented an 
additional barrier to entry to potential entrants (which are not entitled to these 
payments) given that they induce the incumbent generators to reduce prices 
below the level that would make entry profitable. Indeed, Gas Natural has 
publicly complained about the existence of CTCs, which, it believes, distort the 
                                                 
43 Endesa has local market power in Andalusia and Catalonia; Iberdrola on the East coast, and 
Unión Fenosa in the Central region of Spain. 
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functioning of the wholesale market, and induce firms to set very low prices 
that make the new plants unprofitable (see EL PAIS, July 29, 2004).44   
 
Investment 
Investment in generation capacity has been suboptimal, with no new 
plant entering into operation from 1998 to 2002 despite the steep increase in 
demand. The system has operated below acceptable adequacy indexes since 
2000. The rolling blackouts that the System Operator had to enforce in 
December 2001 to avoid the collapse of the system exemplified this. 
Exceptionally wet seasons and favourable weather conditions have stopped the 
problems from being more severe. The lack of investment could have been 
compensated by increased imports, mainly from France. Despite this fact, new 
interconnectors have not been built, and most probably, they will not be built in 
the short run. On the one hand, French green activists have systematically 
blocked any project to install new lines; on the other hand, REE has not shown 
much enthusiasm on those projects, probably because of its shareholders. 
 
The Kyoto Agreement 
The Kyoto agreement, via its effect on firms’ costs and market prices, 
will alter firms’ ability to recover their stranded costs. Hence, it will invalidate 
the criteria used by the government to set and distribute the CTCs. Somewhat 
surprisingly, this observation has been absent from the debate about the 
implementation of the Kyoto agreement. Had this issue been raised, it would 
have opened up a real Pandora’s Box of issues related to the lack of robustness 
of the current regulatory regime. Today, the Kyoto agreement has uncovered the 
flaws of the regulatory system, technology changes will do so tomorrow, while 
the continuing volatility of oil and gas prices will highlight its lack of 
robustness. 
To conclude, behind its apparent success, the current regulatory 
system hides several flaws and it is unsustainable as it stands. The need for 
reforms becomes more urgent the closer the end of the CTC system approaches. 
De-concentrating the market structure, by increasing the number of generators 
through divesture and by encouraging new investment and entry, is one 
structural solution, but a change in the rules will likely be needed as well. We 
believe that a political debate about the future of the Spanish electricity system 
has to be opened.45  
                                                 
44 Note that the fact that the incumbent firms find it profitable to invest on CCGTs does not 
necessarily imply that investment by new entrants, with no portfolio of other plants, ought to be 
profitable as well. 
45 At the time of finishing this paper, on October 7, 2004, the Spanish Ministry of Industry and 
Energy has announced a White Book to reform the electricity regulation. Atienza and de Quinto 
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